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Illegitimate Children and
Constitutional Review

INTRODUCTION:

AUTHORS' STATEMENT OF PURPOSE OF THE COMMENT

The status of the illegitimate child, as a secondary citizen, is
readily apparent in the state of the law of the several jurisdictions
in the United States. While the states have been gradually doing
away with most archaic classifications and restrictions, which result mainly from common law influences, the illegitimate child is
precluded by law from sharing with legitimate offspring in the
intestate distribution of the property of one or both of his natural
parents in the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions
today.
It is the opinion of the authors that such preclusion by the states
violates the rights of the illegitimate under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States.
The purpose behind this Comment is to supply authority for the
position of the authors. We begin by exploring the status of illegitimates at common law, and the reasons which were advanced to
support this status. We continue by setting forth certain criteria
by which the Supreme Court of the United States approaches
Equal Protection arguments and, then, undertake to isolate and
discuss those tests used by the court to determine the rights of
illegitimates. The conclusion of this Comment applies those tests
used by the Supreme Court to reach the result that preclusion of
the illegitimate from intestate distribution of the property of one
or both of his natural parents violates the rights of the illegitimate
under the Equal Protection Clause.
AN HISTORICAL SURVEY

OF THE RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATES

AT CoImnmox LAW

The rights of an illegitimate at Common Law were very few, being
only such as he could acquire. The illegitimate at Common Law
could inherit nothing and was looked upon as the son of nobody.
The illegitimate was sometimes called 'filius nullis,' (the son of
no one) and sometimes 'filius populi' (the son of the people).'
1.

I

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND

4th Ed. 1899) (Hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE.)

459 (Cooley
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The Common Law precluded the illegitimate from intestate inheritance from both his mother and his father; moreover, the
illegitimate was not entitled to any support from his father until
such right was created by statute in the form of the so-called
"Poor Laws."'2 The method in which English law provided for the
maintenance of illegitimates through enactment of the "Poor Laws,"
was similar to paternity actions in many United States jurisdictions today.3 The giving of an oath and the posting of security
with subsequent trying of the issue of fatherhood was, in substance,
an action to establish paternity and impose upon the putative father
a duty to support the child. If this form of adjudication and proof
was sufficient to create a duty of support upon the putative father,
why wasn't it sufficient, then, to create a right of intestate inheritance in the illegitimate child? To answer this question, we must
turn now to the reasons behind the advent of the duty and right
of support.
Prior to the enactment of the "Poor Laws," the parish, wherein
the mother of the illegitimate resided, was one of the few benefactors available for support of the child. 4 The financial burden of
support placed upon the parish resulted in the influence of the
church being exerted upon the law-making policy of the civil authorities. This influence was exemplified through the enactment
of the "Poor Laws." 5 Thus, as a result of an economic burden being
placed upon one of the mightiest institutions of the day, a right
of support by his putative father was created in favor of the illegitimate. The removal of an economic burden, which had been borne
by one of the powers of Common Law England, gave birth to a
right in favor of the illegitimate. Perhaps, if such an economic
burden had been placed upon an influential interest group of the
day by reason of the illegitimate's failure to succeed to his
father's estate by intestacy, the form of the Common Law in this
area would have taken a different course also.
The influence of the Church did not prevail in the area of inheri2. BLACKSTONE at 459.
3. "When a woman is delivered, or declares herself with child, of a
bastard, and will by oath before a justice of peace charge any person
having got her with child, the justice shall cause such person to be apprehended, and commit him till he gives security, either to maintain the
child, or appear at the next quarter sessions to dispute and try the fact."

Id. at 459.
4. Id. at 459.

5. Id. at 459.

tance. While it was one of the major policy-making powers of the
times, the Church suffered a defeat in its attempts to have the
English Law adopt the Canon Law method of legitimization. 6 This
great legislative defeat occurred in 1236 at the Merton Parliament
when the Bishops of England requested that the Law of England7
be conformed to the Canon Law custom of "Mantle Children.P
This custom enabled illegitimate children of a couple who were being married to be legitimated by placing the children under the
cloak which was spread over their parents during the marriage ceremony." The Church met defeat in this power struggle when it came
up against the Barons of England who did have an economic interest involved. The Barons refused to abandon the English Law
by unanimously joining in the proclamation "nolumus legis Angliae
mutare" (we do not wish to change the English Rules).o
The economic reasons supporting the Barons' refusal to adopt
the Canon Law must be considered in light of the concepts of Feualism which were entrenched in the Common Law. The preoccupation of feudal England with the ownership of land gave rise to
the concepts of primogeniture and the fee tail, the innovations
which Blackstone viewed as causing the position of the illegitimate
child to become more perilous. 10 Those who formulated these policies did not want to give illegitimates any rights in the estate of
the deceased father. So long as the illegitimate was limited to
succession to the property of the heirs of his body only, he would
pose no obstacle to the legitimate's rights of succession from the
common father.
Another economic factor concerned the escheatment of the illegitimate's property upon his death. If the illegitimate were to
die lacking issue of his body, his property, both real and personal,
would escheat to his lord." Perhaps this too weighed heavily on
the minds of the Barons of Merton.
Other reasons for the illegitimate's inability to inherit by intestacy have been advanced by Blackstone and Kent. Kent attributes
the common law rule to a policy of morals:
6. HOOPER, THE LAW OF ILLEGITIMACY 27 (1911).
7.

2 F. POLLOCK AND F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

397-98

(2d Ed. 1898) (Hereinafter cited as POLLOCK).
8. POLLOCK at 397-98.
9.

2 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 8 (Ist Ed.).

10. BLACKSTONE at 459.

11. "A bastard being, in the eye of the law, nullius filius, he has no
inheritable blood, and is incapable of inheriting as heir, either as to his
putative father, or his mother, or to anyone else, nor can he have heirs
but of his own body." 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 222 (8th
Ed. 1854) (Hereinafter cited as KENT).
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This rule of the common law so far at least as it excludes him
(the illegitimate) from inheriting as heir to his mother, is supin policy, to discourage illicit composed to be founded partly
12
merce between the sexes.

Blackstone attributes the rule to a policy of care and maintenance
of the child, and to evidentiary problems:
A bastard by our English laws, is one that is not only begotten,
And the reason of our
but born, out of lawful matrimony ....
English law is surely much superior to that of the Roman, if we
consider the principal end and design of establishing the contract
of marriage, taken in a civil light, abstractly from any religious
view. The main end and design of marriage, therefore, being to
ascertain and fix upon some certain person to whom the care, the
protection, the maintenance, and the education of the children
should belong: this end is, undoubtedly, better answered by legitimating all issue born after wedlock . . . 1. Because of the very
great uncertainty there will generally be, in the proof that the issue
was really begotten by the same man, whereas, by confining the
proof to the birth, and not the begetting, our law has rendered it
perfectly certain what child is legitimate, and who is to take care
of the child .... 13

The rigor of the common law rule has been alleviated in all of the
American jurisdictions. 14 This has been accomplished by legitimation statutes. Every one of the fifty states has a statute which enables parents of illegitimate children to legitimate them. 15 Most
of those statutes allow subsequent legitimation of illegitimate children, resulting in their being on equal par with legitimates when
it comes to intestate inheritance. In the absence of subsequent
legitimation, the child is precluded from intestate succession. It
would appear that the common law rule has been only partially
alleviated in the United States, and that further change is needed.
At this time, the most advanced legislation is to be found in two
jurisdictions: Arizona and Oregon. These states, by statute, provide that all children are the legitimate children of their natural
parents and allow them to inherit as such.
Every child shall inherit from its natural parents and from their
kindred heir, lineal and collateral, in the same manner as children
born in lawful wedlock. 16
12. KENT at 222.

13.

BLACKSTONE

at 455-56.

14. Vernier and Churchill, Inheritance By and From Bastards, 20 IA.
L. REV. 216 (1935).
15. Ester, Illegitimate Children and Conflict of Laws, 36 IND. L.J. 163,
164-65 (1961).
'16. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 14-206 (1956).

The legal status and legal relationships and the rights and obligations between a person and his parents, their descendants and
kindred, are the same
for all persons, whether or not the parents
17
have been married.

In other states, legitimation may result from the subsequent
marriage of the child's parents, 18 or the subsequent marriage plus
some form of acknowledgement of paternity of the father. 19 While
the methods of legitimation vary from state to state, the three
methods set out appear to be the most common.
Hesitation by the majority of the states to allow illegitimates to
inherit by intestacy appears to be based on traditional deference to
the Common Law and problems of proof of paternity. Current
innovations, backed by burden of proof safeguards, could well remove this proof problem and place the illegitimate on an equal
standing with legitimate offspring.
Having illustrated the reasons for the common law rule which
precluded the illegitimate from intestate inheritance from his natural parents, it is now the authors' intention to set forth our argument for changing the common law rule. We feel that this can be
brought about only by the action of the United States Supreme
Court. The theory by which this state of the law should be
changed is that of Equal Protection of the Law. This comment
now turns to the application of this argument and begins by setting forth certain tests which are used by the Supreme Court in undertaking an Equal Protection analysis.
20
AN ANALYTIC SYLLOGISM OF EQUAL PROTECTION

Recent treatment by the Supreme Court of the subject of illegitimatcy has been less than satisfying. 21 The major opinions have
in some cases been contradictory and in almost all cases have been
17. ORE.REV. STAT. § 109.060 (1959).
18. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 25.20.050 (1962); CAL. CIV. CODE § 215 (West
1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-274 (Supp. 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 742.091.
19. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-2-8 (Supp. 1971); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch.
3, § 12 (1965); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 190, § F; Mo. REV. STAT.

§ 474.070.

20. An in depth analysis of the Equal Protection Clause is beyond the

scope of this comment; see generally, Frank and Munro, "The Original Un-

derstanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131
(1950); Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the "Natural-Law-Due-ProcessFormula," 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 716 (1969); Tussman
and Tenbroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341
(1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV.
1065 (1969).
21. See notes 39, 45 and 47 infra.
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analytically naked. We can commiserate with Prof. Krause in his
observation:
It is regrettable . . . and may mar the new law of illegitimacy for
some time to come . . . that the Supreme Court did not choose to
document its epochal decision more carefuly. 22

Fortunately, it is possible to determine at times how the Supreme
Court analyzed a particular situation by looking at the outcome of
the case in light of previous cases dealing with the same problem.
Since one of the purposes of this comment is to state the current
Constitutional position of the illegitimate child, it is necessary to
determine the analytic process the court went through in reaching
their major decisions. This can only be done by putting the decisions dealing with illegitimacy in context with an Equal Protection
syllogistic framework. Thus, a brief review of the analysis of
Equal Protection is necessary to the discussion at hand.
Under its most basic interpretation, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids any scheme of statutory
classification which bears no reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 23 When utilizing this traditional standard of
review, the court will presume the Constitutional validity of the
legislative enactment; and, thus, the burden of negativing all possible reasonable relationships to a valid legislative purpose will fall
upon the party seeking to strike down the statute. 24 It must be
noted that in order to be considered "legitimate," the state purpose
in enacting the classificatory scheme need only be within the valid
Police Power of the state to legislate for the promotion of the
general Health, Welfare and Morals of its Citizenry. 25 Thus, seldom will a discriminatory scheme have an invalid purpose. But,
if such a scheme were to have for its purpose simple inequality, it
26
would be unconstitutional by definition.
When a classification is drawn along lines upon which the court
22. H. KRAUSE,

ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND

SOCIAL PoLicy 66 (1971).

23. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Graham v.

Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1970); Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).

24. Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152 (1918); Morey
v. Dowd, supra note 23; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) sepa-

rate opinions Frankfurter, J. and Harlan J.).

25. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Minneapolis & St. L.
Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1888).

26. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

has fastened the characterization of "suspect, '2 7 the analytic process which is Equal Protection undergoes elemental changes. No
longer will a valid state purpose support such a classification;
where the lines are suspect, the scheme must be rationalized by
a "compelling" state interest.2 8 Moreover, when examining the
relationship between a suspect classification, and the legislative
purpose for which it is ostensibly maintained, the court will utilize
strict scrutiny. 2 When utilizing its "strict scrutiny," the court will
demand a greater degree of relevancy in the relationship involved.
Procedurally, the effect of a scheme being based upon a suspect
classification is to reverse the usual presumption of constitutionality and place the burden of justifying the classification upon the
State.30
A statutory scheme that distinguishes between two or more
classes in order to achieve some legislative objective will invade
some interest of those classes since the only reason for any classification is to treat classes differently in relation to some common
interest in order to effect some purpose. When the interest invaded
by the scheme of classification is held by the court to be important enough, the analysis under Equal Protection will be much the
same as that applied in dealing with a suspect classification. Thus,
in dealing with a classification that invades an important personal
right, the court will utilize strict scrutiny in examining the degree
of relevancy between the classification and the state purpose sought
to be promoted by the classification.8 1 Such an invasion can only
be justified by a compelling state purpose;3 2 and upon the State
rests the burden of justifying that invasion.8 8
Under the Equal Protection analysis of a classification that invades an important personal right, the characterization of which interests are to be given such elevated status becomes the doctrinal issue. Under the view propounded by Mr. Justice Black, only
those rights expressly enumerated within the four corners of the
27. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Black); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
supra 26 (Asian); Graham v. Richardson, supra 23 (Alienage); Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (National Origin); Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971) (Women).
28. Id.
29. See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
30. Loving v. Virginia, supra note 27; In Re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100,
473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
31. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
32. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
33. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); In re Antazo, supra
note 30.
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Constitution may be granted such exalted status.34 While the view
principally held by Mr. Justice Douglas would simply grant that
5
status to any interest which the court felt was important enough.3
The recent trend of the court has been to expand the concept of
Equal Protection through the utilization of the concept of the fundamental interest.8 6 Professor Karst argues that the willingness of
the majority of the court to create new "fundamental" or "important" personal interests and suspect classifications has in effect developed a new analysis of "invidious" discrimination which has
adopted some of the features of the now discredited doctrine of substantive due process. 37 Under this new analysis of Equal Protection,
the court will balance the relative weights of the classification plus
the invaded interest against the state purpose sought to be achieved.
Under this analysis, if the weight of the classification plus the
interest invaded is substantially great, there is a possibility that
88
no state purpose can be compelling enough to justify the scheme.
THE SUPRIivME COURT DEALS WITH ILLEGITIMACY:
LABwE V. VINCENT 39

Treating the subject of discrimination of illegitimate children
within statutes of intestacy may seem to be moot in light of the 1970
decision of Labine v. Vincent. In Labine, Rita Vincent, the acknowledged illegitimate child of a Louisiana intestate, contested the
provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code which denied her the right
to inherit her natural father's estate upon an equal basis with
legitimate children. 40 Through her guardian, she argued that a
34. Cf. Adamson v. California, 322 U.S. 46 (1946); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964) (dissenting opinions Black, J.).
35. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
supra note 31.
36. Karst, supra note 20.
37. Traditionally the only type of discrimination which is constitutionally infirm is "invidious discrimination," e.g., Morey v. Dowd, supra note
23.

38. E.g., Harper v. Virginia St. Bd. of Elections, supra note 31; Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, supra note 35; see Karst, supra note 20 at

732-49.
39. 401 U.S. 532 (1970).
40. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Art. 206: "Illegitimate children though duly
acknowledged, cannot claim the rights of legitimate children;" LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. Art. 919: "Natural children are called to the inheritance of their

statutory scheme which barred an illegitimate from sharing in her
father's estate constituted invidious discrimination against a particular class of children and was, thereby, in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mr. Justice Black, writing for a majority of five, did not agree
with the conclusion of unconstitutionality advanced by the guardian of Rita Vincent. The holding in Labine adopted the suprising
approach of refusing to apply any Equal Protection analysis at all:
But the choices reflected by the intestate succession statute are
choices which it is within the power of the State to make. The
Federal Constitution does not give this Court the power to overturn the State's choice under the guise of Constitutional interpretation because
the Justices of this court believe they can provide
better rules. 41

In essence, the court exempted the Statutes of Intestate Succession from constitutional review. 4 2 This is a rather novel proposition of law, considering that as late as 1961 the Supreme Court affirmed the propositions that the Tenth Amendment did not immunize areas in the law pertaining to the devolution of property
from Federal regulation, 43 or constitutional review. 44 This theory
is supportable only upon the premise that specific state action may
be reviewable for some purposes and may not be reviewable for
other purposes.
To fully understand the true import of Labine, and place it in
perspective, it is necessary to fill the void in which it stands with

respect to its contemporaries. This contextual analysis will be undertaken by a contemporary Supreme Court analysis of those cases
45
involving illegitimate children.

In 1968, with the decision of Levy v. Louisiana,4 and its com-

panion case Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance
Company,4 7 the Supreme Court drastically altered the scope of
permissible discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate chil-

dren. In Levy/Glona, the Court was presented with provisions of
the Louisiana Wrongful Death Statute which provided that the relationship of illegitimate child/mother would not support an action
natural father, who has duly acknowledged them, when he has left no
descendants nor ascendants, nor collateral relations, nor surviving wife,
and to the exclusion only of the State."
41. 401 U.S. 532, 537 (1970).
42. Id. at 541, 548-49.

43. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961).
44. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961).

45. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Weber v. Aetna Cas. and
Sur. Co., 496 U.S. 164 (1972); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).

46. Id.
47. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
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based on wrongful death.48

In a holding articulated by Mr. Jus-

tice Douglas, the Court subjected the statutory classification scheme
to Equal Protection analysis and found it to be constitutionally
infirm.
As discussed, the Court normally places the burden of negativing a rational purpose underlying a discriminatory scheme upon
the opponent of the scheme. However, in Levy/Glona, it appears
that the Court placed the burden of justifying the scheme upon
the state. Only four possible rationalizations were dealt with, as
opposed to a review of the many rebuttals that would have been
necessary had the burden been upon the State's opponent. Such
a shifting of burden only takes place in cases of suspect classifications or classifications that affect important personal rights.
The possible state interests reviewed by the Court were the
following: 1) the fact that the child of the deceased was illegitimate might have some bearing on the primary cause of action
held by the decedent 49 as would contributory negligence of the deceased5" or of the Plaintiff-Beneficiary; 5 1 2) the fact that the child
was illegitimate would have some relationship to the legislative
purpose of the wrongful death statute,52 as would a lack of suffering prior to the death of the deceased; 53 3) a classification based
upon illegitimacy would have some relationship to the legitimate
purpose of promoting legitimate relationships;5 4 or, 4) making such
48. LA. Civ. CoDE ANN., Art. 2315: "The right to recover all other
damages caused by an offense or quasi offense, if the injured person dies,
shall survive for a period of one year from the death of the deceased in
favor of: (1) the surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased
... "; "Our jurisprudence is well established that 'child' means legitimate and putative children for the wrongful death of a parent," Levy v.
State, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (1966).
49. Levy v. Louisiana, supra note 45, at 72.
50. Little v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 581 (E.D. La. 1968).
51. Abate v. Hirdes, 9 La. App. 688, 121 So. 755 (1929).
52. Levy v. Louisiana, supra note 45, at 72; the Louisiana wrongful
death action allows recovery for, among other things, the loss of support
that the decedent would have given the beneficiary, e.g., Gray v. Nathan,
221 So. 2d'859 (La. App. 1969); in Levy the court specifically pointed out
that under Louisiana Law both parents are under a duty to support their
illegitimate child, 391 U.S. 68, 73 note 5 (1968).
53. Cf. Walker v. Joseph P. Geddes Funeral Serv., 33 So. 2d 570 (La.
App. 1948).
54. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., supra note 47, at 75.

a classification serves the state interest of discouraging fraudulent
claims.

55

The Court summarily disposed of the first two possible state interests by stating that the status of the children's birth had no relationship to the harm done to the mother and that they were as
dependent upon her for support as any child. 56 Looking to the
third objective of the statute, Mr. Justice Douglas scoffed:
Yet we see no possible rational basis (Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457,
463-66) for assuming that if the natural mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause of
illegitimacy would be served. It would, indeed, be farfetched to
assume women have illegitimate57children so they can be compensated in damages for their death.
It is interesting at this point to note that Mr. Justice Douglas

relied upon Morey v. Dowd5 8 as authority for the application of the
test of rational relationship. Since Dowd is the one case that has
struck down a state economic regulatory scheme on Equal Protection grounds in the past thirty years, it would appear that Mr. Justice Douglas felt confident enough in this analysis not to seek the
refuge of authority supporting a more stringent analysis.5 9 When
first examining Levy/Glona, it appears that Mr. Justice Douglas
based his entire analysis upon the traditional standard of equal protection used today primarily only in the area of economic regulation; he speaks only in terms of the lack of rational relationship
to the various state purposes examined. However, closer examination of the Levy opinion reveals additional clarification of the
Court's view of the type of scheme that was involved.
First, the burden of justifying the classification appeared to
have been cast upon the state60 as is the case of review of a suspect
classification or when a classification invades a fundamental or important interest.6 ' Moreover, Mr. Justice Douglas refers to the
statute as one which invades a "basic civil right. '6 2 Secondly, the
classification involved was ultimately held by the Court to constitute "invidious discrimination," 63 a term which Mr. Justice Douglas
uses to describe a particular type of discrimination which operates
against a disadvantaged group to deprive the group of an interest
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 76.
Levy v. Louisiana, supra note 45, at 72.
Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., supra note 47, at 75.
354 U.S. 457 (1957).
See, e.g., cases cited in notes 27, 29, 30, 31 and 33 supra.
See p.271 supra.
See p.272 and notes 30 and 33, supra.
391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
Id. at 72.
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of great importance and which is not justified by a compelling state
interest. 4 As his authority for utilizing this standard, Mr. Justice
Douglas relied upon Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,65 the case
which more than any other developed this particular analysis and in
which Mr. Justice Black vigorously dissented. 66 Finally at trial,
Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages for two elements of harm:
a) the damages to them for the loss of their mother, and b) damages for pain and suffering which vested in their decedent prior
to her death and survived to her children. 67 Analyzing the purpose
of the wrongful death statute, Mr. Justice Douglas characterized it
as allowing compensation for the loss of support, 8 but made no distinction in the award of damages to only those sought to compensate for that loss of support. In other words, the holding of Levy
must have either characterized the cause of action which survived
to the children for pain and suffering as support, or stated that the
survivorship of that cause of action was important enough to outweigh the state interest involved. 69
The Levy/Glona decisions were decided in 1968, a full three years
prior to Labine. Less than a year after handing down Labine the
Court dispelled some of the fog generated by those two cases in
opposition by rendering Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company.70 In Weber the Court was afforded the opportunity to review
the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation scheme which denied the
right of dependent illegitimate children to participate in benefits
for the accidental death of a parent upon an equal basis with dependent legitimate children. 71 Caught between the conflicting authority of Levy/Glona and Labine, the Court elucidated its past
decisions and provided a firmer basis for future review of classifications between children based upon status of birth. Labine was
distinguished on two points, first:
that decision reflected in major part, the traditional deference to a
state's prerogative7 2to regulate the disposition at death of property
within its borders.
64. See p. 273 and note 35, supra.
65. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra note 31.
66. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra note 31 (dissenting opinion); Karst, supra note 20, at 718-20.

67. 391 U.S. 68, 69-70 (1968).
68. See p. 276 and note 56, supra.
69. See p. 282 and note 93, infra.
70. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
71. Id. at 167-68.
72. Id. at 170.

This is in deference to Mr. Justice Black's view of non-review.
However, in bolstering the rationale of Labine's theory of not reviewing a subject traditionally within the prerogative of the
State, the Court added that the State had a substantial interest in
such classifications which bore upon the problem of intestate successon:
Yet the substantial state interest in providing for the stability of
land titles and in the prompt and definitive 5determination of the
valid ownership of property left by decedents.7
It would appear that, rather than adopting the Black view, the
Court chose to interpret its prior holding as based upon an Equal
Protection analysis which sustained the validity of the scheme.
Secondly, Labine is characterized as involving a situation in
which the deceased father could have easily remedied the position
of his illegitimate daughter either by legitimating her or by making
a testamentary disposition to her.7 4 In Weber the deceased father could have done nothing to alleviate his daughter's disfavored
position vis A vis the Workmen's Compensation scheme. It is submitted that this argument is weak in as much as the issue would
not have arisen had the child been legitimated. Moreover, in both
cases the Court was not concerned with the operation of the statute upon fathers but upon disfavored children.
The Workmen's Compensation scheme in issue in Weber was
analogized by the Court to the statutory recovery for wrongful
death in Levy since both were created to provide close relations and
dependents of a deceased with a means of compensation for his
death.7 5 Thus, Levy was held by the Court to control the issues
in Weber, not Labine.
The Weber decision goes to great pains to restate the Equal Protection analysis used in the case, possibly, in reaction to criticism
of its earlier holdings in Levy/Glona and Labine.Y' As expressly
stated by the Weber court, strict scrutiny is used in examining
fundamental personal rights. Inferentially, the fundamental personal rights the Court refers to in Weber are the same referred to
77
in Levy- the right to support.
The possible state purposes for the classification issue in Weber
(promoting legitimate family relationships, distinction in degree of
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id. at 170-71.
Id. at 171.
See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1970)
opinion); KRAUSE, note 22 supra.
77. 406 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1972).

(Brennan J., dissenting
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dependency between legitimate and illegitimate children, alleviation
of probative problems) were all negatived as not being compelling
enough to justify the classification. 7s Thus, the Court applied Equal
Protection " .

.

. to strike down discriminatory laws relating to

status of birth where-as in this case-the classification is justified
by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise. '7 9 (Emphasis added).
Clearly in Weber, the Court utilized its strict scrutiny which is
only used in cases dealing with suspect classifications or as invading
important personal interests.8 0
The three decisions favoring the illegitimate child, Levy, Glona
and Weber, were simply interpreted by the Court in Gomez v. Perez 8 ' as holding "that a state may not invidiously discriminate against
illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded
children generally. '8 2 The Court continued to say that when a
state created a right to needed support on behalf of legitimate
children that there was no constitutionally sufficient justification
for denying such an essential right to illegitimate children. Thus,
it may be doubtful
whether even a justification characterized as
"compelling"8 3 could rationalize such a classification. It appears
that the Court again has emphasized that a classification based upon
illegitimacy is suspect, and that when such a classification invades
an interest that can be characterized as support, it will have invaded an important personal right.
Summarizing the principles derived from the Levy/Glona line
of decisions we find that:
1) A classification based upon illegitimacy is suspect.
2) Interests which relate to support are essential personal rights.
3) The state interest in promoting legitimate relationships
probably has no rational relationship to a classification based
upon illegitimacy where that classification operates affirmatively upon the illegitimate children themselves.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
80.
81.
82.
83.

See p. 272 and notes 29 and 31, supra.
409 U.S.535 (1973).
Id. at 538.
See p. 273 supra.

4)

The state interest in alleviating probative problems is not
such a compelling justification as will justify a classification
based upon illegitimacy.

5)

Any classification based upon illegitimacy will be subject
to close scrutiny upon constitutional review.

6)

In order to justify a classification based upon illegitimacy,
the state must bear the burden of justifying the classification
by a compelling state interest.

In opposition to the collection of principles derived from the
Levy/Glona line of cases is the principle of Labine v. Vincent; that
is, any classification created under the rubric of "providing for in8 4
testate succession" is immunized from constitutional review.
It appears that the analytic factors involved in the two lines
of opposition are indistinguishable. Can the principles derived
therefrom be reconciled? The position of the authors is that they
cannot.
CONCLUSION

It is the position of the authors that the basis for the holding in
Labine v. Vincent was erroneous and contrary to the accepted interpretation of the Constitution and, more particularly, the Equal
Protection clause. Thus, the issue dealt with in Labine should be
re-examined and subjected to some Equal Protection analysis."5
It would appear that the Court, subsequent to Labine, discovered that the principles set forth by Mr. Justice Black conflicted
with those held by the then majority. In Weber the Court returned
to the line of reasoning held prior to Labine and attempted to distinguish Mr. Justice Black's view in light of the result reached in
Weber.8 1 Mr. Justice Powell, speaking for the Court in Weber, attempted to fit the Labine decision into one of the tests of Equal
Protection as understood by the majority, dealing with a substantial
state interest. From Mr. Justice Black's view of no review whatsoever, the Court had now advanced the Equal Protection argument to the stage of judicial review overwhelmed by a substantial
state interest. This, coupled with Mr. Justice Powell's reliance on
Levy, results in the Court utilizing a strict scrutiny standard as if
dealing with a classification which invades a fundamental righta far cry from Labine.81
84. 401 U.S. 532, 537 (1970), see pp. 273-74, supra.

85. See p. 274 and notes 43 and 44, supra.

86. See p. 277, supra.
87. See pp. 277-78, supra.
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If the Supreme Court should decide to re-examine the holding of
Labine v. Vincent, there are several factors which, the authors submit, merit consideration. The first of these factors with which the
Court will have to deal concerns the concept of "suspect classificaions."
As discussed, when a classification is drawn along lines on which
the Court fastens the characterizations of "suspect," all examinations of the relationship between the classification and the legislative purpose for which it is maintained will be subjected to "strict
scrutiny" by the Court.88 The use of the "strict scrutiny" yardstick will result in the Court requiring a greater degree of relevancy in the relationship involved.8 9 The classification and the purpose behind it will be weighed. It would appear that the suspect
classifications test has been adopted by the Court in the application
of the Equal Protection Clause to the rights of illegitimates, and
that the Court has gone even beyond the strict scrutiny standard
and now applies a standard which asks whether or not the classification is invidiously discriminatory 0 The application of this new
understanding of what constitutes invidious discrimination of illegitimates should result on their being placed equally before the
law with legitimates with regard to intestate succession.
Another factor which will merit the Court's consideration is the
concept of "fundamental or important personal rights." Whenever
there is a state action which effects such rights, the action falls under the analysis of a suspect classification and is subject to strict
scrutiny. 91 Advancing from this stage, what, if any, fundamental
personal rights are in peril under a state classification whereby
the illegitimate is precluded from sharing in intestate succession?
In the Levy/Glona cases, the court held that illegitimate children
may not be precluded from recovering under the Louisiana Wrongful Death Statute for the death of a parent by reason of their birth.
Later, in Weber the Court held that illegitimates may recover for
the death of their putative father under the Louisiana Workmen's
Compensation Laws. In 1973, in Gomez v. Perez, the Court held
that the denial under Texas Law of an illegitimate's child's right
88.
89.
90.
91.

Cases cited note 27, supra.
Id.
Karst, note 20; p. 276, supra.
Cases cited note 30, supra.

to support from the child's natural father violated the Equal Protection Clause. In all of these cases, illegitimate children were denied Equal Protection of the laws as to a certain right characterized
as the right to support.
Is the right of an illegitimate child to support, as outlined by the
cases cited above, a fundamental personal right deserving the protection of the Equal Protection Clause?
Mr. Justice Douglas in his opinion in Levy allowed Plaintiffs'
recovery and characterized Wrongful Death actions as compensations for the loss of support. In his opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas
alluded to the fact that, through the death of their mother, illegitimate children suffered the loss of their support. Referring
to the Louisiana Law whereby both parents are under a duty to
support their illegitimate children, the Justice said, "(t)hese children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her; .. .in her death

they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent would.

'92

In Weber, Mr. Justice Powell speaking for the Court, referred to
the fact that all of the decedent's children, both legitimate and
illegitimate, were equally dependent on the decedent for maintenance and support and suffered equally by his loss. In Gomez, in a
per curiam opinion, the Court found that the denial of an illegitimate child's right to support from its natural father violated the
Equal Protection Clause.
If the fundamental right status has been awarded to the right
of support, what distinction can remain for refusing to allow an
illegitimate child that support by a different means; that is, intestate succession?
It must be remembered that, in Levy, Plaintiffs sought the recovery for not only the loss of their mother, but the pain and suffering that she experienced prior to her death. No distinction was
made between these two elements of damages. It would appear
that by the decision in Levy the illegitimate child was granted a
limited right of inheritance by intestacy as to the survival of a
cause of action for personal injury in Tort. The Louisiana courts
have themselves characterized the basis of such a claim as the Laws
of Inheritance and not the Law of Tort.9 3 Perhaps Levy laid the
groundwork for a determination of the issue of an illegitimate's
right to inherit by intestacy under the Equal Protection Clause.
It can be argued that intestate succession is a continuation of a
92. 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).

93. Brown v. T.J. Moss Tie Co., 32 So. 2d 848 (La. App. 1948).
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parent's duty to support his children, both legitimate and illegitimate.
In any case, regardless of the label attached to the illegitimate's rights, whenever these rights are in issue under the Equal
Protection Clause, a summary of the cases cited would seem to indicate that the Court will subject the classification scheme to strict
scrutiny, as a suspect classification. 94 Under this approach, the
Court will narrow the allowable legislative latitude and place the
burden on the State to justify the classification in issue by showing
a compelling state interest.95

Any re-examination of the Labine issues would necessitate consideration by the Court of the possible state purposes behind the
classification. At this point, it would be of value to discuss some
of the possible state purposes which have arisen in the past, and
which may arise in the future, to justify such a scheme. It is the
opinion of the authors that none of these purposes should be considered as advancing a compelling state interest.
It has been suggested that one of the possible compelling state
purposes behind the classification of illegitimates as being unable to
inherit through intestate succession has been to promote the cause
of legitimate family relationships. The states have undertaken
through their classifications to discourage procreation of children in
meretricious relationships. Thus, the states contend that, if illegitimate children are unable to inherit through the laws of intestate succession, there will necessarily be fewer illegitimate births
since everyone knows that people have illegitimate children for
the purpose of allowing the children to inherit through intestacy.
Similar state reasoning advanced in Levy/Glona was discarded by
Mr. Justice Douglas.9 6 Analogizing the Wrongful Death Claim in
Levy to the right of intestate inheritance by illegitimates, there
appears to be no rational basis to assume that women have illegitimate children so that they may take by way of intestate succession upon her death.9 7 Another possible argument against such
reasoning may be raised by the application of the Due Process
94. See p. 278, supra.
95. E.g., cases cited in notes 27 and 29, supra.
96. P. 276 and note 59, supra.
97. Cf. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).

Clause. While discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this
comment, perhaps it is appropriate to raise the question at this
time. Does a statutory classification scheme that operates upon
a class of individuals in such a way as to punish the class for the
transgressions of another class (illegitimate parents) deprive the
punished class of due process of the law?
Another state purpose advanced to support the classification of
illegitimate children centers around the probative problems which
may arise if illegitimates were allowed to inherit through intestate
succession. Generally, this purpose has been negatived by the Court
by referring to the existing state methods of proof98 and concluding
that any probative problem is not compelling enough to survive
strict scrutiny or to deprive illegitimates of a fundamental personal right. 9
It has been argued that the state purpose in such a classification
scheme is to give effect to the presumed intent of the intestate. 10 0
In other words, the decedent intends to discriminate among his
children because they are either illegitimate or because his affection for his legitimate children is stronger. It is submitted that
this approach is fallacious inasmuch as it adopts circuitous reasoning. The state may not discriminate for discrimination's sake;
therefore, in adopting such intent, the state may not give life
to an individual's private discriminatory motives. Much the same
are cases in which the state is asked to give judicial life to testamentary trusts based upon racial classifications. 10 '
The remaining state interests advanced to justify discrimination against illegitimate children are the provisions for stability of
land titles and quick administration of estates. Assuming that these
reasons are compelling enough to allow some sort of classification,
it can be argued that these interests can be effectuated in such a
manner as not to invade the interests of a disadvantaged group.
In cases involving a suspect classification, the Court in the past
has demanded that the state use means other than such a classification to accomplish the policy goals upon which the classification
is grounded. 10 2 Stability of land titles could only be effected if a
ruling by the Court were given retroactive effect; to make it prospective only would place illegitimate children on a par with all
98. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 73, 76 (1968).
99. Weber v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1971).
100. In Re Pakarinen,287 Minn. 330, 178 N.W.2d 714 (1970).
101. Cf. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
102. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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other contestants for the estate of a parent. It would not appear
that the cause of quick administration of estates would be hindered
if illegitimate children were allowed to contest, just as any "hidden
heir" is allowed to contest, the administration of the estate. Perhaps legislation limiting the period of presentation of claims to the
estate would alleviate this problem in all cases, not only illegitimate
ones. In this way, illegitimates would be able to perfect their
claims against the estate of the decedent and the administration of
the estate could be timely completed.
Therefore, the examination by the Court of other means of achieving these compelling state interests could result in the removal of
those state interests as a bar to the illegitimate's right to inherit
through intestacy.
A review of the purposes advanced to justify discriminatory
schemes based upon illegitimacy vis a vis intestate succession suggests that the reasons for the state's refusal to allow illegitimates
to inherit are mere shams. It would appear that the only state interest in this scheme of inequality is that of maintaining the tradition of the Common Law. In these changing times, the states have
blindly adhered to the antiquated notions of the Common Law as
to the status of the illegitimate and have refused to step into the
20th century. As was stated by Mr. Justice Holmes:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of the law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation
of the past. 103

If one reviews the reasons for the Common Law rule, it becomes
apparent that greed played a dominant factor in the adoption of a
rule which precluded an illegitimate child from inheriting by intestacy. The concepts of primogeniture and fee tail saw to it that
land remained in the family after the death of the patriarch. The
opportunity to acquire land by escheat and the other economic
benefits attributed to the Common Law rule aided in its acceptance
and perpetuation by the lawmakers of the day.10 4 Certainly, the
reasons of Common Law England's nobility cannot be expected
103. Holmes, Oliver Wendell, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457
(1897).
104. See generally pp. 266-68, supra.

to stand in modern jurisprudence. The application of constitutional
protections to all of the Citizenry by the Supreme Court and, in
particular, the current expansion of the Equal Protection Clause
call for the abandonment of this Common Law anachronism. In
order to bring the rights of the "non-marital child" into the light of
the 20th century, it will be necessary for the Supreme Court to reexamine the principles upon which it based its holding in Labine
v. Vincent and to overrule that decision on grounds that it violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
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